Description
nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, the staking contract accepts `UpdateValidator` transactions that set `new_voting_key=Some(...)` while omitting `new_proof_of_knowledge`. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while only producing a single signature. While the impact is critical, the exploitability is low: The voting keys are fixed for the epoch, so the attacker would need to know the next epoch validator set (chosen through VRF), which is unlikely. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.
Affected products
nimiq: nimiq proof-of-stake
References4
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-pf4… PatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/e7f0ab7d2115e17d6e554… Patch
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3654 Issue TrackingPatch
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0 Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.8
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 10 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-347
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.