תיאור (מקור, אנגלית)
nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, the staking contract accepts `UpdateValidator` transactions that set `new_voting_key=Some(...)` while omitting `new_proof_of_knowledge`. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while only producing a single signature. While the impact is critical, the exploitability is low: The voting keys are fixed for the epoch, so the attacker would need to know the next epoch validator set (chosen through VRF), which is unlikely. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.
מוצרים מושפעים
nimiq: nimiq proof-of-stake
קישורים4
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-pf… PatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/e7f0ab7d2115e17d6e55… Patch
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3654 Issue TrackingPatch
- github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0 Release Notes
מדדים
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.8
MEDIUM
מקור הציון: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N - EPSS — סבירות ניצול
- 0% אחוזון 10 · נכון ל-13 בנובמבר 2026
- CWE
- CWE-347
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