Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kzalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_params)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath12k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3
References5
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/26f8f87f0a556e7984366c64cebc16d49e15d22f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c6eb712a91fa079be6f9f1419c96e0ad2227081
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/79c6f4f7d16eea1bcb8bc5c8fd6ec04a01b0614f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9a5d12cbdeb860306f8d47c92caee0ea6ee0e0a
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3355e0fdbbf531ca8b82a6a3feb80a1b7306a8b
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.4
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 8 · as of 8 November 2026
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