Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Compile tested only.
References6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/75185e2b214e842b7e0af29e5d1fef155662b8b1
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a246c72132eb943b5844ba79dad597b47429dba
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/acff2713c3212ade15051e7b421f15c89927e70f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2ecd548f89a4a6c14b5eb4abc825f92b3068dda
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbb3b3334a9ed850c5b332eedea107796e691237
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/deb14c9932509c0defaa0620c9ca8d20b385a6bd
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.4
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 4 · as of 8 November 2026
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