Description
Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.2, registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads a manifest returned for a digest-pinned request and passes it to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without hashing the body against the requested digest, allowing a malicious or intercepted registry response to substitute attacker-chosen manifest content even when Docker-Content-Digest claims the requested value. The bundled pull-through proxy in registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go can cache and re-serve the substituted manifest. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.2.
References4
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.8
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 12 · as of 11 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-354
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.