Description
Heym before 0.0.98 fails to apply SSRF egress guards to WebSocket Send and WebSocket Trigger nodes, allowing authenticated users to connect to internal services. Attackers can craft workflow nodes with arbitrary URLs and headers to reach internal services and read responses from the WebSocket Trigger node.
References7
- github.com/heymrun/heym
- github.com/heymrun/heym/blob/v0.0.97/backend/app/services/webso…
- github.com/heymrun/heym/blob/v0.0.97/backend/app/services/webso…
- github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/540aade7c7495295062f32f4dfd0d680…
- github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/v0.0.98
- github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-mqw6-g845-w596
- www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.98-ssrf-via-websoc…
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.4
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N - CVSS 4.0
-
5.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 29 · as of 8 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-918
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.