Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: validate individual TWT params before driver setup ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action() only partially validates a received S1G TWT setup frame before queueing it. An individual agreement can therefore reach ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup() with twt->length too short for the full struct ieee80211_twt_params. The individual path passes twt to drv_add_twt_setup(). Both the tracepoint and the driver callback consume the complete parameters block, not merely req_type. Do not pass a short individual agreement to the driver. Broadcast agreements remain unchanged because they are rejected locally after accessing only req_type. [edit commit message to not overclaim lack of validation nor understate driver impact]
References7
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0502d5077e419427d80f4d46ba95d0067f5fb916
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/09d60d1f72e6598241490eb6c4e97245af895c09
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/47fb04c3826e1f90271d405523043d6708b9072a
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/92fcd0f30dc8e51f252589b082d46851d295cc1a
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ade9e2f0f7f4d3089600ac2af8ef0b91746f923b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b558e07708d886acfcf4b0391ed7a8546e81d326
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff558072d199c1d641d1561da622e67f780514de
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.8
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 15 · as of 8 November 2026
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