Description
VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. In 1.26.29 and earlier, selected metadata IOCTL handlers in the VeraCrypt Windows veracrypt.sys driver accept caller-supplied object-manager and device paths broader than supported VeraCrypt workflows require. A local user who can open the intentionally user-accessible \.\VeraCrypt device can use TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK, TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO, VC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX, or the legacy TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY handler to make src/Driver/Ntdriver.c perform kernel-context symbolic-link or disk-device lookups outside the intended path scope. This can disclose low-sensitivity drive-letter targets, partition information, disk geometry, GPT or MBR state, and limited object-manager path metadata.
References3
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
3.3
LOW
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 1 · as of 11 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-200
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