Description
Punk::OAuth2 versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an attacker-chosen off-site redirect after login because same_origin_path accepts a backslash or tab in the return parameter. oauth2_login reads the return parameter from the initiation request, runs same_origin_path over it, and stores the survivor in the session flow record as the post-login redirect target. That check rejects a value that does not begin with a slash, one with a slash as its second byte, and one containing CR or LF. A backslash and a tab pass. The URL Standard treats a backslash as equivalent to a slash for special schemes, so `/\evil.example` parses with the authority `evil.example`. It also strips ASCII tab before parsing, so a tab between two leading slashes leaves `//evil.example`. A crafted link to the application's own login route lands the victim on the attacker's site after a genuine authentication. The redirect carries no authorization code or access token.
References6
- datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-4.11.1
- metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.02/source/include/po…
- metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.03/changes
- url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser
- url.spec.whatwg.org/#relative-slash-state
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/20/1
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.7
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 43 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-601
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.