Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: handshake: Require admin permission for DONE command ACCEPT and DONE are the two downcalls of the handshake genl family, both intended for use by the trusted handshake agent (tlshd). ACCEPT already requires GENL_ADMIN_PERM; DONE has no privilege check at all. The fd-lookup in handshake_nl_done_doit() only confirms that some pending handshake request exists for the supplied sockfd; it does not authenticate the sender. An unprivileged process that guesses or observes a valid sockfd can therefore submit a DONE with HANDSHAKE_A_DONE_STATUS == 0, leaving the kernel consumer to proceed as if the handshake succeeded. A non-zero status on a forged DONE tears down a legitimate in-flight handshake before tlshd can report its real result.
References5
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/25fb53e43ec006ac69b9e825a7e8a11d63a6083e
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dafc411948469277b276724c3b2b4408c02c04c
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/67cec2f1eb9e58719d622e92e2278ceda72dbd85
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/81246a65303d9635266b1334490142caaf86a11f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6557f912509abe8e70223373dd7a44d1d4a0d6c
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.8
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 3 · as of 11 November 2026
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