Description
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses. The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.
Affected products
zenhive: machine payments protocol
References4
- github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j7-7qc3-5f24 Vendor Advisory
- github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/46c5b0e1311da7d92190dc7d9ea89027a… Patch
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73829.html Third Party Advisory
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73829 Third Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
3.7
LOW
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N - CVSS 4.0
-
6.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 26 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-367
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