Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_read_sock() A peer may send a zero-length TLS application_data record; TLS 1.3 explicitly permits these as a traffic-analysis countermeasure (RFC 8446, Section 5.1). After decryption such a record has full_len == 0. tls_sw_read_sock() hands it to the read_actor, which has no payload to consume and returns zero. The loop treats a zero return as backpressure (used <= 0), requeues the skb at the head of rx_list, and stops. rx_list is serviced head-first on the next call, so the empty record is dequeued, fails the same way, and is requeued again; every later record on the connection is blocked behind it. tls_sw_recvmsg() does not stall on this: a zero-length data record copies nothing and falls through to consume_skb(). Mirror that in the read_sock() path by recognizing an empty data record before the actor runs, consuming it, and continuing.
References5
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0867b0f2513ebc1c475af9898c97f4772a68d964
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3be28e2c9cd0230cb51fd4967df095273afd3848
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6b440cf766a557b08d25f1b571b3d57d039686e
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8a4c9fc437b16aef38f86ce3275677e36924259
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebc295ce343600c2d60c1e1e0c5d192080217457
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 50 · as of 11 November 2026
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