Description
HTTP::Tiny versions before 0.095 for Perl forward credential headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When the server returns a 3xx redirect, `_maybe_redirect` follows the `Location:` header and `_prepare_headers_and_cb` re-merges the caller's `headers` argument into the new request, without checking whether the redirect target shares an origin with the original URL. Caller-supplied `Authorization`, `Cookie` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers are therefore re-sent to whatever host the redirect names, across scheme, host or port boundaries, and including `https` to `http` downgrades that expose them in plaintext on the wire. The HTTP::Tiny POD note that "Authorization headers will not be included in a redirected request" applied only to the URL-userinfo Basic-auth path, not to headers passed explicitly by the caller.
References7
- github.com/Perl-Toolchain-Gang/HTTP-Tiny/commit/84984ef3930ddd4…
- github.com/Perl-Toolchain-Gang/HTTP-Tiny/commit/8f32ca89e21c3ad…
- github.com/Perl-Toolchain-Gang/HTTP-Tiny/commit/e7a03aedf239515…
- github.com/Perl-Toolchain-Gang/HTTP-Tiny/pull/36
- metacpan.org/release/HAARG/HTTP-Tiny-0.095-TRIAL/changes
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/07/13
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.1
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 30 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-522
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