Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a challenge ACK. RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped. Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.
References6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fe4636665d14a258de70b4f3e8248e6d42038f1
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/22cec809b048495310f206d9abbcdbbfbdce3ae3
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/234f9ffbd9b2c1b24ec67200ea3cff07401bec48
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b0a3a094f4cae2fb92e4d08d4eef7246a9d9c49
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a28c4fcbf774e23b4779cae468e3497a5ad1f4a1
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5dc463cc60eb26079b19607c9dbda76491dad05
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.2
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 35 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-20
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