Description
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, in the reported deployment, case-report templates uploaded by `customer_user`, the lowest-privilege portal role, are later executed by non-sandboxed Jinja2 engines when an admin or analyst generates a report. The `/case-report-template/upload` route in `backend/app/incidents/routes/db_operations.py` validates only the filename-derived MIME type, not the template content. Templates share a global store without customer_code scoping, and `customer_user` can also list, download and delete them, allowing an attacker to replace a legitimate default template under the same name. In `backend/app/incidents/services/reports.py`, `render_document_with_context` uses `DocxTemplate` without a sandbox; in `backend/app/incidents/services/reports_pdf.py`, `render_html_template` uses a non-sandboxed `Environment` without autoescaping. Normal privileged requests to `POST /api/incidents/report/generate-report-docx` or `/generate-report-pdf` therefore evaluate attacker-controlled Jinja expressions as Python on the backend. The reported deployment executes commands as root, exposing all tenants' incident and SIEM data and stored connector credentials. The HTML/PDF wkhtmltopdf renderer additionally permits local-file reads and requests to internal services. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
References4
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.0
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 14 · as of 2 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-94CWE-862CWE-1336
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