Description
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's STOMP encoder ( StompSubframeEncoder ) does not escape or validate header values in CONNECT and CONNECTED frames, so raw newline ( \n ) characters in a header value are written directly to the wire, allowing an attacker who controls a header value to inject additional STOMP headers. This happens because the encoder intentionally skips escaping for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames per the STOMP 1.2 specification but never rejects the raw newlines, and since a broker parses each line as a separate header, an attacker controlling a value such as a user-supplied login or passcode can overwrite connection parameters or add authentication/role headers to bypass authentication or escalate privileges (the actual impact is broker-dependent). The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
Affected products
netty: netty
References2
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3g8r-4pfx-jmfh MitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3g8r-4pfx-jmfh MitigationVendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.5
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 36 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-93
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