Description
Prowler is a cloud security platform. Prior to 5.30.3, Prowler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token, and the ACS finish logic in api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py recalculated the tenant from user.email instead of binding token issuance to the validated SAML configuration. An authenticated attacker with a controlled SAML IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for an attacker-controlled domain while asserting an email address from another configured domain, causing a SAMLToken and tenant-scoped JWT to be issued for the wrong tenant and enabling cross-tenant account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 5.30.3.
Affected products
prowler: prowler
References6
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/security/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-… ExploitVendor Advisory
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/security/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-… ExploitVendor Advisory
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/commit/bf3b5c2ba713e5330149271… Patch
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/commit/f5ff30ad175bd2edf02cd28… Patch
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11650 Issue Tracking
- github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.30.3 Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.6
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 46 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-287
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.