Description
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.
Affected products
network-ai: network-ai
References4
- github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a9… Patch
- github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2 PatchRelease Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.1
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 8 · as of 14 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-22CWE-23
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