Description
Hermes WebUI before 0.51.521 validates the workspace of an imported session under the active named profile but constructs the Session object without setting its profile in the /api/session/import handler, so the imported session is persisted with a null profile. Because a null profile is treated as the default profile by the profile authorization check, a user on the default profile can export the imported session transcript and use its session identifier to read files from the named profile's workspace, defeating the application's profile isolation.
References6
- github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/commit/3d5ef4758e920ba6888d49a…
- github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/pull/4489
- github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/pull/4506
- github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/releases/tag/v0.51.521
- www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hermes-webui-cross-profile-authori…
- github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/pull/4489
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.5
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - CVSS 4.0
-
6.0
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 40 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-732
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