Description
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.
Affected products
wolfssl: wolfssl
References2
- www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/ Vendor Advisory
- github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10702 Issue TrackingPatch
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N - CVSS 4.0
-
8.2
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 4 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-347
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