Description
An integer underflow in bt_mesh_sol_recv() in the Bluetooth Mesh solicitation handling (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c) leads to an out-of-bounds write. When CONFIG_BT_MESH_OD_PRIV_PROXY_SRV is enabled, the function parses solicitation PDUs from raw BLE advertising payloads. The AD parsing loop reads an attacker-controlled length byte (reported_len) and computes reported_len - 3 without checking that reported_len >= 3. When reported_len is less than 3, the subtraction is performed in signed int arithmetic and yields a negative value that bypasses the length guard and is then implicitly converted to a very large size_t when passed to net_buf_simple_pull_mem(). In builds without assertions, this wraps the buffer length and advances the data pointer far out of bounds, so subsequent reads dereference invalid memory. A nearby BLE device can trigger this with a non-connectable advertisement carrying a UUID16 AD structure and a crafted length byte, with no pairing or prior association required, potentially leading to denial of service or arbitrary code execution.
Affected products
zephyrproject: zephyr
References1
- github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 17 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-787
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