Description
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, the class-definition import endpoint /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/{id}/import accepts a DataObject field name that is emitted without an identifier allowlist by lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php into generated PHP properties and by models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Helper/Dao.php into ALTER TABLE identifiers. An authenticated user with the objects permission can inject PHP syntax into the generated DataObject class, causing attacker-controlled code in generated var/classes/DataObject/.php files to run when an object of that class is instantiated, and can also inject SQL identifier content into schema-changing statements. The central models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data.php::setName() validation did not reject semicolons, braces, backticks, spaces, or other non-identifier characters. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.
References6
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/a4f8c3cfee58b7d5fe4873d67782e…
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19183
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v2026.1.6
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-9x44-4gxf-8…
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.9
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 51 · as of 8 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-89CWE-94
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