Description
Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-alpha.18, Lemmy blocks new private messages from a sender after the recipient blocks that sender, but the edit path skips the same block check. create_private_message checks the recipient's block list with PersonActions::read_block before inserting a message, while edit_private_message in crates/api/api_crud/src/private_message/update.rs only checks that the caller is orig_private_message.creator_id. The update then writes new content and returns the modified PrivateMessageView without consulting the recipient's block list, allowing a blocked sender to keep changing an old message that the recipient can still see and providing a post-block harassment path. This issue is fixed in versions 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-alpha.18.
References8
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/commit/051b317c9d14b91972bb372c67f319…
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/commit/2d169d630b86b9351e4b1dca451214…
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/pull/6472
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/pull/6476
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/releases/tag/0.19.19
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/releases/tag/1.0.0-alpha.18
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/security/advisories/GHSA-46g9-847m-qf…
- github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/security/advisories/GHSA-46g9-847m-qf…
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
5.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 42 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-862
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