Description
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with [email protected] into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. [email protected] preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
Affected products
budibase: budibase
References2
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-w7mq-r738… ExploitVendor Advisory
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-w7mq-r738… ExploitVendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.6
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 43 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-22CWE-59
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