Description
vLLM is a high-throughput and memory-efficient inference and serving engine for LLMs. Prior to 0.24.0, a frontend-legal multi-request speculative decoding workload can cause the rejection sampler to produce a recovered token equal to the model vocabulary size boundary value, which is then converted to negative one when the engine selects the next live token for a request and is written back into the drafter's input ids; that out-of-vocabulary value is later consumed by the model's embedding and attention path and crashes the engine worker with a GPU device-side assertion. The same triggering request sequence is reachable through the public gRPC Generate and Abort endpoints, so a remote client that can send generation requests can crash the shared engine worker, aborting concurrent requests and causing a service-wide denial of service for other clients of the deployment until the worker is restarted. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.0.
Affected products
vllm: vllm
References4
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8wr5-jm2h… Vendor AdvisoryExploit
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8wr5-jm2h… Vendor AdvisoryExploit
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/8a5cf1ccd65e8ac7635c402c1ec… Patch
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44744 Issue TrackingPatch
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 50 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-20CWE-1284
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.