Description
Radius is a cloud-native, portable application platform that makes app development easier for teams building cloud-native apps. Prior to 0.58.0, the Kubernetes controller deserializes the user-controlled radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment and uses its container resource identifier for deletion without confirming ownership by that Deployment. An attacker with permission to modify Deployment annotations and knowledge of a target Radius resource ID can forge radapp.io/status and set radapp.io/enabled to false, causing reconciliation to enter the privileged deletion path for another tenant's Radius-managed container resource. In a multi-tenant installation this confused-deputy condition can delete another team's recoverable container resource and disrupt service; in a single-tenant installation the impact is limited to self denial of service. The multi-tenant Radius controller reads the annotations in pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go and reaches the privileged delete in pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go. The issue does not disclose data, grant privileges, or provide persistence. This issue is fixed in version 0.58.0.
References5
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.7
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 28 · as of 11 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-20CWE-441
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