Description
Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.20.0 until 1.1.0, The chrome-devtools-mcp daemon writes its PID file with fs.writeFileSync() to a deterministic runtime path. On typical macOS environments, and on Linux sessions where $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is unset, that runtime path falls back to /tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<uid>/daemon.pid. Because the write does not use O_NOFOLLOW, a local low-privilege user on the same POSIX host can pre-create /tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<victim_uid>/daemon.pid as a symlink to a file writable by the victim. When the victim later starts daemon mode, fs.writeFileSync() follows the symlink and truncates the target file to the daemon PID string. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.
Affected products
google: chrome-devtools-mcp
References1
- github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp/security/advisori… ExploitThird Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.1
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 1 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-59
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.