Description
Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times. The path name might be known or guessed by an attacker, especially for applications known to be written using Dancer with standard installation locations. The epoch time can be guessed by an attacker, and may be leaked in the HTTP header. The process id comes from a small set of numbers, and workers may have sequential process ids. The built-in rand() function is seeded with 32-bits and is considered unsuitable for security applications. Predictable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Affected products
perldancer: dancer\
References3
- security.metacpan.org/patches/D/Dancer/1.3522/CVE-2026-5080-r1.… Patch
- metacpan.org/release/BIGPRESH/Dancer-1.3522/source/lib/Dancer/S… Product
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/30/19 Mailing ListThird Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.9
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 30 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-338CWE-340
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