Description
FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency.
Affected products
pavel-odintsov: fastnetmon
References3
- lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48689-dynamic-buf… ExploitThird Party Advisory
- github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon Product
- github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon/blob/master/src/dynamic_bi… Product
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.8
CRITICAL
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 53 · as of 14 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-787CWE-122CWE-193
Could this be exploited in your environment?
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