Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
References6
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-48599.html
- github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/33b6a095dbc91c6dee3c7b90893d…
- github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/8aaf3d3a8c4c7b08ac65e9c6f254…
- github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/security/advisories/GHSA-mwr4-5g34-…
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-48599
- github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/security/advisories/GHSA-mwr4-5g34-…
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
7.6
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 28 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-639
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