Description
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. Prior to version 5.0.10, each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The signed payload contains only the canonical row content, with no version counter or freshness binding. An attacker who can write `store.db` and the matching `data_signatures` row — feasible during the opfilter-update window when the Endpoint Security filter is offline, or via offline-boot / decrypted-backup scenarios — can substitute a previously-captured legitimately-signed snapshot. opfilter accepts the older snapshot as fully valid on next boot because the existing signatures still verify. Version 5.0.10 patches the issue.
References1
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
6.9
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 4 · as of 14 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-294
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.