Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
Affected products
linux: linux kernel
References8
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c0d71ef12f46c57d37bc571f3f2797db7eb50cc Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fedefec757192dcaad29a664ac332c7601be144 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4376c672c3648d5bdc31dfffc329d07164f93c4 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520 Patch
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.1
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 44 · as of 14 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-190
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