Description
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, netty_unix_socket_recvFd sets msg_control to `char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]` (line 940) — 24 bytes on 64-bit Linux. A peer-sent SCM_RIGHTS cmsg carrying two ints has cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(8) = 24, which fits exactly with no MSG_CTRUNC, so the kernel installs both fds in the receiving process. The subsequent check `cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))` (line 972, expected 20) fails, the branch that would read the fd is skipped, and neither installed fd is closed. The for(;;) loop calls recvmsg again (non-blocking → EAGAIN → Java maps to 0 → read loop exits normally), leaving two leaked fds per message. There is no MSG_CTRUNC handling. Reachable via Epoll/KQueue DomainSocketChannel when the application opts into DomainSocketReadMode.FILE_DESCRIPTORS (non-default). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Affected products
netty: netty
References3
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-w573-9ffj-6ff9 Vendor Advisory
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final Release Notes
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
4.0
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 3 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-200CWE-772
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