Description
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Affected products
netty: netty
References10
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-x4gw-5cx5-pgmh Vendor Advisory
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final Release Notes
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final Release Notes
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26017
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26018
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26586
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28573
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34608
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37390
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41951
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 61 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-770
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