Description
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's PCF POST /npcf-smpolicycontrol/v1/sm-policies handler (HandleCreateSmPolicyRequest) panics with a nil-pointer dereference when a downstream OpenAPI consumer call (UDR lookup) returns 404 Not Found and the consumer wrapper returns err != nil together with a nil response struct. The handler logs the OpenAPI error and continues executing instead of returning, then dereferences the nil response struct on a subsequent line and panics. Gin recovery converts the panic into HTTP 500, so a single attacker-shaped POST returns 500 instead of a clean 4xx whenever the downstream lookup fails. The PCF process keeps running. The trigger is a single POST containing input that causes the downstream UDR lookup to fail (e.g. an unknown DNN). In 4.2.1 this endpoint is also reachable WITHOUT an Authorization header because the PCF Npcf_SMPolicyControl route group is mounted without inbound auth middleware. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
Affected products
free5gc: free5gc
References5
- github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-wr8j-6chw-g… ExploitVendor Advisory
- github.com/free5gc/pcf/commit/df535f5524314620715e842baf9723efb… Patch
- github.com/free5gc/pcf/pull/62 Issue TrackingPatch
- github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/803 ExploitIssue Tracking
- github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/803 ExploitIssue Tracking
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 35 · as of 14 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-476CWE-754
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