Description
UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.
Affected products
uvnc: ultravnc
References3
- github.com/ultravnc/UltraVNC Product
- uvnc.com/ ProductRelease Notes
- www.securin.io/zero-days/cve-2026-44040-libc-rand-weak-rng-vnc-…
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.5
MEDIUM
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 34 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-338
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