Description
Symlink following vulnerability in Gleam's Hex package export allows files outside the project root to be embedded in the generated package tarball. The file collection helpers (gleam_files, native_files, private_files) in compiler-cli/src/fs.rs use follow_links(true) when walking publishable directories such as src/ and priv/. The collected paths are added to the package archive via add_path_to_tar in compiler-cli/src/publish.rs without verifying that the resolved target remains within the project root. A symlink placed under a publishable directory will cause gleam export hex-tarball or gleam publish to embed the contents of the symlink target into the generated Hex package. An attacker with write access to the project repository can place a symlink in src/ or priv/ pointing to an arbitrary file. When a maintainer or CI pipeline runs gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball, local files readable by the publisher (such as secrets, tokens, or SSH keys) are silently embedded into the published package artifact. This issue affects gleam: from 0.10.0-rc1 before 1.17.0.
References6
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-42795.html
- github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/commit/6435a5528b9ae0449e2f32be5796…
- github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/commit/c82a2d83bd0c06cafdc196820deb…
- github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/security/advisories/GHSA-qhh5-fg4c-…
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-42795
- github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/security/advisories/GHSA-qhh5-fg4c-…
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
5.1
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 10 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-59
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