Description
runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.
Affected products
linuxfoundation: runc
References2
- github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-xjvp-4f… MitigationPatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/864db8042dbb Patch
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
3.3
LOW
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 8 · as of 16 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-61
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.