Description
Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, `DomainZones::add()` accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the `content` field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., `NAPTR`, `PTR`, `HINFO`), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive `trim()` processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via `DnsEntry::__toString()`. An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives (`$INCLUDE`, `$ORIGIN`, `$GENERATE`) into their domain's zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.
Affected products
froxlor: froxlor
References4
- github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-47hf-23pw-3… ExploitMitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-47hf-23pw-3… ExploitMitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/47a8af5d9523cb6ec94567405cfc2… Patch
- github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6 Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 29 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-93
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.