Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2.
Affected products
zfnd: zebra-consensus; zfnd: zebrad
References1
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-xvj8-… Vendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.1
HIGH
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - CVSS 4.0
-
7.2
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 18 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-1025
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.