Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI's AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string '__subclasses__' is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.
Affected products
praison: praisonai
References1
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3c4… ExploitVendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.8
HIGH
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 16 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-94CWE-693
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