Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI automatically loads a file named tools.py from the current working directory to discover and register custom agent tools. This loading process uses importlib.util.spec_from_file_location and immediately executes module-level code via spec.loader.exec_module() without explicit user consent, validation, or sandboxing. The tools.py file is loaded implicitly, even when it is not referenced in configuration files or explicitly requested by the user. As a result, merely placing a file named tools.py in the working directory is sufficient to trigger code execution. This behavior violates the expected security boundary between user-controlled project files (e.g., YAML configurations) and executable code, as untrusted content in the working directory is treated as trusted and executed automatically. If an attacker can place a malicious tools.py file into a directory where a user or automated system (e.g., CI/CD pipeline) runs praisonai, arbitrary code execution occurs immediately upon startup, before any agent logic begins. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.
Affected products
praison: praisonai
References2
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2g3… Vendor Advisory
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2g3… Vendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.8
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 12 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-94CWE-426CWE-829
Could this be exploited in your environment?
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