Description
BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier's signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: 'direct', the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: 'issuance', the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.
Affected products
sgbett: bsv-wallet; sgbett: bsv ruby sdk
References6
- github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-hc36-c8… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-hc36-c8… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
- brc.dev/52 Not Applicable
- github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/commit/4992e8a265fd914a7eeb0405c… Release Notes
- github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/issues/305 Issue Tracking
- github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/pull/306 Issue Tracking
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.1
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 3 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-347
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.