Description
A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.
Affected products
uutils: coreutils
References2
- github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 ExploitIssue Tracking
- github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 ExploitIssue Tracking
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 1 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-59CWE-367
Could this be exploited in your environment?
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