Description
In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.
Affected products
canonical: lxd
References3
- github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-q96j-3fmm-7fv4 ExploitThird Party Advisory
- github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-q96j-3fmm-7fv4 ExploitThird Party Advisory
- github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/17921 Issue Tracking
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.1
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 38 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-20
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