Description
Notesnook is a note-taking app. Prior to version 3.3.11 on Web/Desktop and 3.3.17 on Android/iOS, a stored XSS in the Web Clipper rendering flow can be escalated to remote code execution in the desktop app. The root cause is that the clipper preserves attacker-controlled attributes from the source page’s root element and stores them inside web-clip HTML. When the clip is later opened, Notesnook renders that HTML into a same-origin, unsandboxed iframe using `contentDocument.write(...)`. Event-handler attributes such as `onload`, `onclick`, or `onmouseover` execute in the Notesnook origin. In the desktop app, this becomes RCE because Electron is configured with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`. Version 3.3.11 Web/Desktop and 3.3.17 on Android/iOS patch the issue.
Affected products
streetwriters: notesnook desktop; streetwriters: notesnook mobile
References1
- github.com/streetwriters/notesnook/security/advisories/GHSA-f42… ExploitVendor Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.6
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 54 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-79CWE-94
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.