Description
A bug in `BaseSerialization.deserialize()` allowed unrestricted `import_string()` of attacker-controlled class paths when the Scheduler / API Server loaded a serialized DAG: a DAG author could embed a malicious trigger into a DAG to gain remote code execution on the API Server / Scheduler process, crossing the Airflow security boundary that DAG-author code must never execute in those processes. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deployments where DAG-author trust is limited can restrict the `[core] allowed_deserialization_classes` config to a narrow allowlist.
Affected products
apache: airflow
References4
- lists.apache.org/thread/otvdw8qt2y7xy2n5nq9xby9ky4rf5ltj Mailing ListVendor Advisory
- github.com/apache/airflow/pull/66002 Issue TrackingPatch
- github.com/apache/airflow/pull/68528 Issue TrackingPatch
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/07/1 Mailing ListThird Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.8
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 2% percentile: 77 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-502
Could this be exploited in your environment?
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