Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/privcmd: fix double free via VMA splitting privcmd_vm_ops defines .close (privcmd_close), but neither .may_split nor .open. When userspace does a partial munmap() on a privcmd mapping, the kernel splits the VMA via __split_vma(). Since may_split is NULL, the split is allowed. vm_area_dup() copies vm_private_data (a pages array allocated in alloc_empty_pages()) into the new VMA without any fixup, because there is no .open callback. Both VMAs now point to the same pages array. When the unmapped portion is closed, privcmd_close() calls: - xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range() - xen_free_unpopulated_pages() - kvfree(pages) The surviving VMA still holds the dangling pointer. When it is later destroyed, the same sequence runs again, which leads to a double free. Fix this issue by adding a .may_split callback denying the VMA split. This is XSA-487 / CVE-2026-31787
Affected products
linux: linux kernel
References10
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1576ff3869cbd3620717195f971c85b7d7fd62b5 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/24daca4fc07f3ff8cd0e3f629cd982187f48436a Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2894a351fe2ea8684919d36df3188b9a35e3926f Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b985d3a024b9e8c24e21671b34e855569763808 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/402d84ad9e89bd4cbfd07ca8598532b7021daf95 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/446ee446d9ae66f36e95c3c90bbcc4e56b94cde0 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/71bf829800758a6e3889096e4754ef47ba7fc850 Patch
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbf862ce9f009128ab86b234d91413a3e450beb4 Patch
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/28/14 Mailing ListThird Party Advisory
- xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-487.html Third Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.8
HIGH
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 8 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-415
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.