Description
@fastify/static before version 10.1.3 contains an incomplete fix for a previous route guard bypass. The static file handler rejected only parent directory segments, but it did not canonicalize dot segments, duplicate slashes, encoded dots, or backslashes before route matching and before delegating to the send layer. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker could request a file protected by a route based guard using a non canonical path form that misses the guarded route yet resolves back onto the protected file, disclosing its contents. Applications that protect a subtree of the static root with a route based guard are affected, while applications relying on the allowedPath option are not. This is fixed in @fastify/static 10.1.3, which canonicalizes the pathname, including rejecting backslashes, on the path used for routing and serving.
Affected products
fastify: fastify-static
References2
- github.com/fastify/fastify-static/security/advisories/GHSA-423g… MitigationVendor Advisory
- cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html Third Party Advisory
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 52 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-22CWE-436
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