Description
Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.
References4
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.5
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 5 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-918
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